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Abstract 
In recent years the rail sector has experienced significant demand growth that leads to increased competition for the scarce resource 
of railway capacity. In Great Britain, the current policy tends to favour passenger trains to freight operators. This study explores 
how existing railway capacity allocation process can be improved in order to strengthen the competitiveness of freight train 
operators. A decision that is faced by the Infrastructure Manager herein is to determine how the scarce resource should be allocated 
among the different operators such that the overall social welfare can be maximised. In particular, we are interested to look at the 
implications on social welfare, system efficiency, and (re-)distribution of benefits among operators should more capacity be 
allocated for freight trains. The research questions were investigated through a set of simulation games based on a real world 
scenario collected from the Brighton Main Line (BML) in Southeast England. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to model and analyse impacts of the hypothesised preferential treatment of freight operators under several sets of regulations and 
bidding frameworks on efficiency, equity, and social welfare. Our findings reveal improvements in social welfare and equity among 
different operators, but loss of rail system efficiency due to the increased level of heterogeneity seen in the train mix. From the 
perspective of infrastructure utilisation, on heavily congested mixed traffic lines, investments for freight train services should be 
prioritised in order to reduce the speed differentials between slower freight and faster passenger trains and increase flexibility of 
scheduling and reduce capacity loss. It is also found that infrastructure managers’ expertise has an important impact on the quality 
of the initially proposed timetabling solution. We conclude with a list of suggested improvements to the current Great Britain policy 
so that the needs of freight operators and hence their customers are better represented.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the rail sector has experienced significant demand growth that leads to increased competition for the 
scarce resource of railway capacity. In the United Kingdom, the existing allocation policy tends to favour passenger 
to freight train operators. This study explores how this process can be improved to strengthen the competitiveness of 
freight operating companies. A decision faced by the Infrastructure Manager herein is to determine how scarce 
infrastructure resource should be allocated such that the overall social welfare is maximised. In particular, we look at 
the implications on social welfare, system efficiency, and (re-)distribution of benefits among operators should more 
capacity be allocated for freight trains.  
2. Background 
The beginning of the 20th century on most European railways was the time when several railway companies were 
competing for the same passengers or freight consignments by providing services on the national railway 
infrastructure. For various reasons, the competitors were nationalised and became nationwide monopolies. During the 
last few decades vertical separation of operations from infrastructure has again been seen as a remedy for improving 
efficiency, social welfare2 or providing higher quality of services. Typically, the Infrastructure Manager (IM) is a 
single provider of track infrastructure (rails, sleepers, switches, signalling, power supply etc.) and the Railway 
Undertakings (RUs) run services in competition with each other, or serve different market segments or geographical 
areas over the common track infrastructure, for which they have to pay access charges3. 
From the economic point of view separation gave rail some natural-monopoly characteristics which makes it similar 
to other utilities such as roads or telecommunication networks. In contrast to roads, capacity shortages cannot be 
overcome by dissolving queues in real time (Nilsson 2002). Decisions about how the trains are run are taken well 
before their departures and therefore the IM’s strategic task is to allocate the scarce resource among different users to 
resolve train path conflicts, assure efficiency and provide non-discriminatory access, which is not easy a task. 
This project is concerned about how to improve the railway capacity allocation process in the United Kingdom to 
strengthen the competitive position of Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) and hence their customers in relation to 
other RUs (mainly Passenger Train Operating Companies TOCs) and alternative modal competitors (primarily road 
transport). The research question is what the implications for the social welfare, efficiency and fairness of the solution 
would be if more capacity was to be allocated for freight rail by applying changes to existing UK administrative 
procedure of capacity allocation (such as to priorities and freight-passenger trains mix ratios). This will be investigated 
by developing a set of simulation games based on real world case study of the Brighton Main Line (BML) and applying 
different set of ‘game rules’ in each of the scenarios.  
3. Literature review 
3.1. Definition and calculation of railway capacity  
There are different approaches to how railway capacity should be defined. Mussone and Calvo (2013) defined it as 
the maximum number of trains that can traverse the network in a given time window, subject to management 
constraints like junction capacity. Burdett and Kozan (2006) described it as the maximum volume of customers and 
goods that can be transported within a network in a given time period. EU Directive 2001/14/EC defined capacity as 
the potential to schedule train path requests on a railway system. A train path is described as the railway capacity 
 
2 This paper, similar to Nilsson’s approach (2002), is not going to justify whether vertical separation of railways per se is welfare enhancing. It 
will focus on how to improve the tools for capacity allocation if vertical separation is to stand any chance of enhancing sector efficiency. 
3 Interestingly, at the core of The European Commission’s (1998) policy are the benefits of competition within the traditionally closed market, 
however, the EC provides no advice on how to practically charge for scarce capacity and how to divide it among different uses. 
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consumption resulting from a train movement. For this work the widely accepted definition by European Commission 
(2001) is being used. 
3.2. Optimisation of railway capacity allocation 
Most of the work in the area has been done at the micro level of timetabling – an overview of the main studies was 
presented by Cacchiani and Toth (2012). For example Cacchiani, Caprara and Toth (2010) studied the nominal train 
timetabling problem of slotting freight trains among pre-scheduled passenger trains. Other example is the analysis by 
Cacchiani et al. (2009) who tried to schedule extra freight trains on railway networks while passenger trains follow a 
prescribed timetable that cannot be changed. For each freight train the RU sets an ideal timetable which can be 
modified by the Manager. A penalty applies for each minute of shift from the ideal arrival/departure time. This is 
formulated as an integer linear programming and employs a Lagrangian heuristics to be solved.  
Other models were proposed by Carey (1994a), Carey (1994b), and Lee and Chen (2009) but these were mainly 
intended for the use of timetable planners to generate schedules that are reliable and minimise expected train delays. 
Caprara, Fischetti and Toth (2002) introduced a model based on a train graph in which each station along a line was 
expressed as a set of 2880 nodes: 1440 indicating arrival and 1440 departure times. Using graph theory, oriented arcs 
and suitable constraints the authors managed to provide a set of paths maximising the RU’s total utility. Caprara et al. 
(2006) extended the basic single line model to take into account multiple tracks and simple networks. 
‘Freight train scheduling with elastic demand’ was a work by Kuo, Miller-Hooks and Mahmassani (2010). Their 
model sought to minimise operating costs incurred by carriers and delays by shippers by scheduling rail services along 
multiple interconnected routes and checking that schedules and demands were mutually consistent. Recent 
developments in ad hoc freight trains scheduling were delivered by Tan and Ng (2014) who argued for introducing 
algorithmic-based decision making systems to support the controllers, who nowadays rely mainly on experience and 
their own knowledge, in scheduling very short notice trains. Some authors argued (i.a. Cai, Goh and Mees 1998) that 
optimal solutions for the Train Timetabling Problem are typically unattainable in large scale and complex scenarios. 
3.3. Strategic modelling of railway capacity allocation 
Very little has been written on the macro level on how to divide the existing capacity among different users. The 
most comprehensive piece of research was delivered by Klabes (2010) who developed a detailed algorithmic approach 
to the Railway Capacity Allocation Problem (RCAP). He set The Competitive European Railway Market as the main 
theme of his work. Not only did he provide interesting insights on how to model and formulate optimisation problems 
but also introduced game theoretical settings to explore potential strategies of the Operators and define Nash equilibria. 
Some other authors, who developed macro frameworks for train scheduling were e.g. Wong and Ho (2010). The latter 
considered a competitive setting, in which RU’s and the IM negotiated access charges and path requests. After several 
rounds and the ‘learning’ process experienced by the players, the timetable was improved (solved via simulation).  
This project is based mainly upon the work by Nilsson (2002) who presented a practicable way of dealing with 
challenges of scarce railway capacity allocation. In 1998 the European Commission introduced legislation that should 
open up railway markets for the benefits of competition but gave little advice on how to price for capacity use and 
how to allocate it between different users. EU Directive 2001/14/EC stated that ideally railway infrastructure capacity 
should be traded as a commodity on a railway market. Nilsson (2002) was trying to address these gaps at the conceptual 
level. Moreover, his report was one of the very few works that joined mathematic and economic perspectives, and 
clearly addressed the issue of enhancing social welfare. The author delivered other papers such as Nilsson (1999) that 
explored auctioning (with experimental games) and railway capacity pricing. 
Crozet (2004) argued for observable convergence of infrastructure charging, despite some regional differences, on 
the EU railway network since introduction of vertical separation and opening the market. Perennes (2014) challenged 
the administrative procedures of capacity allocation and proposed a decentralised, ‘invisible hand’ system. She 
analysed combinatorial auctions and transaction costs for such a framework. The feasibility of distributing track access 
rights though auctioning systems was also described by Affuso (2003), Gibson (2003) and Newbery (2003). An 
interesting game-theoretic approach to address the freight train scheduling problem was proposed by Brewer and Plott 
(1996). They investigated a decentralised, first-price auction to solve railway capacity conflicts and used numerical 
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experiments on a single track line connecting three stations. The authors asked 10 participants to operate trains along 
all or part of the same line at overlapping times. The slot was allocated to the bidder offering highest price. This project 
draws on this experience to introduce simulation games but explores different aspects of the RCAP and uses a real 
world case study data.  
A work by Fragnelli and Sanguineti (2014) focused on introducing incentives for non-cooperatively behaving RU’s 
to increase their utility and improve capacity utilisation effectiveness. A game theoretical model was proposed in 
which agents exchanged information on their needs and were compensated by a possible increase in utility. Their 
report explored imperfect information and its diffusion that closely corresponded to real-world situations, thus making 
it worth analysing. Harrod (2013) challenged auction pricing of network access for North American railways. He 
compared contracting to auctioning and drew some conclusions for governmental subsidies and systems’ transparency. 
Meijer (2012) investigated recently introduced gaming simulation in the Dutch railways with three cases: Rail Cargo 
Market, Railway Bridge and Bijlmet Junction Game. The results support introducing railway capacity auctioning. 
3.4. Economic insights 
This project has also employed functional benchmarking to analyse how the game-theoretic approach could be 
employed in rail by screening other industries. For example Nasiri and Zaccour (2009) conducted an exploratory game-
theoretic analysis of biomass electricity generation supply chain and Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) applied economics-
based optimisation techniques in electric power markets. RCAP is closely related and usually presented jointly with 
the Pricing of Railway Capacity Problem (PRCP) and some interesting economic foundations for the strategic level of 
how to price for the use of scarce infrastructure were provided by Button (2010) and Hensher and Brewer (2004). 
However, the dilemmas such as Short-Run and Long-Run Marginal Cost pricing that aim to maximise the expected 
social welfare are usually difficult to apply in practice. Lingaitis and Sinkevicius (2014) evaluated the economic and 
social phenomena of rail passenger transport. They introduced not only business but also social functions and analysed 
the impact of railway passenger transport activity on macroeconomic social turnover indicators. Kuo and Miller-Hooks 
(2012) considered train pooling incentives as a specific form of coopetition on heavily congested lines. 
4. Methodology 
This paper presents a theoretical framework and a set of experimental studies to analyse the interaction between IM 
and operators through service bidding and scheduling. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to model 
and analyse the impact of providing incentives and preferential treatment to freight operators on social welfare, system 
efficiency and equity. A virtual environment was created based on the real case of Brighton Main Line in South 
England to test the validity of proposed concepts. We invited a range of participants ranging from university students 
to rail professionals. Theoretical framework of the rail capacity allocation process (RCAP) comprised a number of 
steps incl. timetable, constraints and objective function specification. 
The schedule of each train is represented by a series of its departure and arrival times over a set of control points 
(e.g. stations) along its service route. Graphical representation of that is known as the train diagram, in which each line 
represents a train run (the steeper the line, the faster the train is). Each track section is disaggregated into blocks, which 
can accommodate up to one train at a time. Congestion can occur when the traffic volume is high. RCAP is about 
determining how to schedule trains such that the utilisation of the scarce resource – rail infrastructure is maximised 
over a given period of time and what kinds of trains (e.g. passenger, freight, fast, slow etc.) should be given priority at 
different times and locations when allocating limited capacity.  
We consider that there are  profit-maximising RUs which request to run ୫ train services respectively, where ୫ 
is the number of train paths requested by operator m. As a consequent, there will be a total of σ ୫୑୫ୀଵ  trains to be 
scheduled. Furthermore, we denote ୬ǡ୫, where  ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ୫, to be a service path requested by RU . Each of these 
requested service paths ୬ǡ୫  are allocated a time window ୬ǡ୫during which it is profitable to run it. The RCAP 
objective functions include revenue function and Value-of-Access function. 
Figure 1 (left) shows a rectangular and triangular revenue functions in which the x- and y-axes represent 
respectively the departure time of a train and the associated revenue gained by the operator. The rectangular revenue 
function can be associated with a freight train service (more flexible to schedule than passenger train). It implies that 
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revenue can be gained as long as the train can depart anytime within a predefined time window (XX:XX +/- YY:YY). 
In general given a train path ୬ǡ୫, the corresponding revenue ୰ can be determined through a rectangular function as:  
max
, , ,( ) ( )r n m n m n mf p A r   (1) 
where ୬ǡ୫୫ୟ୶is the maximum value in the revenue function for train path ୬ǡ୫. The notation ୬ǡ୫ denotes a binary 
variable which equals to one if the requested train service ୬ǡ୫is allocated a path within profitable time window ୬ǡ୫כ േ
ሺ୬ǡ୫ ൅ ୬ǡ୫ሻ. Ideal time for running train ୬ǡ୫ is represented by୬ǡ୫כ , ୬ǡ୫ shows minutes of shift for early/late 
departure from ୬ǡ୫כ , ୬ǡ୫ represents longer running time than requested (due to congestion e.g. train A has to wait at 
station X to allow train B to pass). If the IM cannot grant such train service request, then ୬ǡ୫will be assigned a value 
of zero which implies that no revenue can be gained by RU m.  With a rectangular revenue function, the revenue 
gained from running the service ୬ǡ୫will be constant at ୬ǡ୫୫ୟ୶  as long as the train departs during ሾ୬ǡ୫כ െ ሺ୬ǡ୫ ൅
୬ǡ୫ሻ,୬ǡ୫כ ൅ ሺ୬ǡ୫ ൅ ୬ǡ୫ሻሿ.  
 
 
Fig. 1 An example of a revenue function (left) and a VOA function (right). 
The triangular function is used for passenger train runs which require being more punctual than the freight services. 
The greater the difference between the ideal and actual departure time, the smaller the revenue obtained will be. The 
triangular revenue function implies that maximum revenue can be gained if the corresponding train departs at an ideal 
time (XX:XX shown in the figure), while the revenue drops at a constant rate for a departure time earlier or later than 
this ideal time and eventual the revenue falls to zero (i.e. non-profitable) when the departure time of the train is outside 
of the profitable time window (XX:XX +/- YY:YY). In general, the triangular function can be expressed as:  
max * * *
, , , , , , , ,
, max * * *
, , , , , , , ,
[ ( )]  ( )
( ) {
[ ( )]  ( )
n m n m n m n m n m n m n m n m
r n m
n m n m n m n m n m n m n m n m
A r t t if t S D t t
f p
A r t t if t t t S D
D
E
  o   d d   o d d    (2) 
where a maximum revenue ୬ǡ୫୫ୟ୶ will be obtained if the train service can be scheduled at ୬ǡ୫כ , while the revenue 
will be decreasing at a rate of  Ƚ୬ǡ୫if it is scheduled earlier than the ideal time, or at a rate Ⱦ୬ǡ୫ if it is scheduled later 
than the ideal time as shown in Equation (2).  
In addition to the revenue function, we also have the ‘claimed’ and ‘paid’ Value Of Access (VOA, Nilsson, 2002) 
functions which respectively represent the willingness to pay and the actual amount paid by the operator to the IM for 
running a train service. Figure 1 (right) shows examples of ‘claimed’ VOA functions. It implies that the RU will have 
a maximum willingness to pay for running a train service if the train service can be allocated by the IM to run (depart) 
at the ideal time (XX:XX). Otherwise, the ‘claimed’ VOA (i.e. willingness of RU to pay for running the service) drops 
at a constant rate over time if the IM can only allocate a time different from the ideal time (XX:XX) for running the 
service. The ‘claimed’ VOA will become zero (i.e. the RU will have no intention to pay to run the service) if the IM 
cannot allocate a profitable time to the RU to run the service. Observe that if a RU claims the whole revenue as VOA 
(1), if he is allocated the ideal slot, the whole revenue is transferred to the IM as an access charge and the retained 
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profit is 0. This strategy might be reasonable if the RU intends to crowd out the competitor from the market. 
Distribution 2 (3) distribution shows 50% (25%) of the potential revenue claimed as VOA, which means the RU would 
like to keep a half (three quarters) of the potential revenue as a profit if the train follows an ideal schedule. Lower 
VOA means a greater risk of rejecting the path but more revenue could potentially be retained as a profit. If the operator 
claims a 0 VOA, his path will be rejected because (in reality) there is a minimum track charge the IM requests (to 
cover Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) of an extra train traversing the network). Both the RU’s and IM’s profits will 
then be 0 (obviously from this particular service). Therefore, the ‘claimed’ VOA is: 
max * * *
, , , , , , , ,
, max * * *
, , , , , , , ,
[ ( )]  ( )
( ) {
[ ( )]  ( )
n m n m n m n m n m n m n m n m
c n m
n m n m n m n m n m n m n m n m
A V t t if t S D t t
f p
A V t t if t t t S D
J
G
  o   d d   o d d    (3) 
The ‘claimed’ VOA will decrease at a rate of ɀ୬ǡ୫if the train service is assigned a time earlier than୬ǡ୫כ , or at a rate 
Ɂ୬ǡ୫if it is assigned later than ୬ǡ୫כ . Please note that: 
, ,n m n mD Jt   (4) 
, ,n m n mE Gt   (5) 
It is noted that the ‘claimed’ VOA represents the amount of cost that the RU is ‘willing’ to pay the IM, but it does 
not necessarily equal to the ‘actual’ amount ୡכሺ୬ǡ୫ሻ that the RU will pay the IM. In general, we have: 
*
, ,( ) ( )c n m c n mf p f pd   (6) 
which implies that ‘actual’ amount that the operator pays the IM for access will be lower or equal to what they are 
willing to pay. The discrepancy between the two, i.e. ሾୡכ൫୬ǡ୫൯ െ ୡ൫୬ǡ୫൯ሿ represents the ‘surplus’ gained by the RU 
while gaining access to the infrastructure. Considering the potential and the VOA to pay, each RU will derive an 
optimal set of train services ୬ǡ୫כ  such that the corresponding profit can be maximised, i.e.: 
,
* *
, , ,
1
arg max [ ( ) ( )]
m
n m
P
n m m r n m c n m
p
p f p f pS
 
  ¦  (7) 
The output of the process hence will be a set of working timetables for each train ୬ǡ୫and a set of VOA 
ୡכ൫୬ǡ୫൯that the RUs pay. In addition to the VOA paid by each operator m, the IM may also receive a subsidy 

୬ǡ୫from the government on a specific RU m on a specific train run n. The use of this subsidy is to prioritise certain 
train services (e.g. freight services) from the government perspective. Hence the total amount ୬ǡ୫ received by the IM 
from RU m for running train service n will be: 
*
, , ,( )n m c n m n mV f p G    (8) 
If a RU’s service request is not in conflict with other RUs, they will be able to run the train as requested. Otherwise, 
one or more operators’ schedule may have to be readjusted until all timetables can be accommodated. From the IM’s 
perspective, the higher the VOA a RU pays, the higher the priority its service request will be accommodated with least 
adjustment has to be made. On the other hand, a RU may however not be allocated by the IM a profitable timeframe 
for running their proposed service if the VOA in the bid is too low compared with other RUs. Under some scenarios 
the RUs will also be given opportunity to revise their service request and timetable specifications and hence the overall 
capacity allocation process can be iterative.  
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The results of the different games were assessed using a set of indicators e.g. actually collected (inc. subsidy) to the 
maximum access charge ratio, actual profit to maximum revenue ratio, number of trains paths allocated to requested, 
average change (shift plus dwell time extension) per accepted train, total change to time window ratio, RU Strategy 
determinant (claimed VOA to maximum potential revenue), overall efficiency in revenue retaining– the sum of total 
access charges and profits retained to maximum potential revenue etc. Some indicators were used for multiple purposes 
e.g. number of train paths requested to accommodated – it was used as indicator showing how efficient the trains are 
scheduled (if the sum for all the RU’s is taken), how fair the current schedule is (comparing indicators for individual 
RUs) and could also be used as a proxy for social welfare – values close to 100% show that almost all the requested 
trains (which were derived from primary railway demand) were accommodated (together with other indicators, such 
as average change per train, fairness of penalty distribution among RUs could be further investigated), which can be 
perceived as socially desirable. Externalities and other costs associated with more trains are excluded from 
consideration. 
5. Brighton Main Line case study 
The Brighton Main Line (BML) is about 80km long, electrified railway line linking London Victoria and London 
Bridge with Brighton via East Croydon and Gatwick Airport. It has a complex structure with a number of branch lines, 
sidings, variable number of tracks (2-4) and speeds (max. 160 km/h), making the problem of train scheduling extremely 
complex. In addition to the track layout, the line is also characterised by its heterogeneous nature with different kinds 
of rolling stock used by two passenger operators: Southern and Thameslink, it is also an important route for the 
aggregates delivery to Newhaven, and has many busy freight terminals at Purley, Crawley and Ardingly.  The train 
line is currently operating close to its capacity (DfT 2014).   
Given the BML layout and current setting, a set of simulation games are developed for the Three Bridges-Brighton 
(TBD-BTN) section. In each experiment setting, there will be four players: two of them are passenger train operators 
(TOC1 and TOC2), one is freight operator (FOC), and the remaining one is IM. All roles are randomly assigned. The 
following hypothetical situation sets the scene for the case study: “In six months a new timetable will be introduced. 
Rapidly rising demand for freight trains poses additional pressure and increases competition for track access. The RUs 
(TOC1, TOC2, FOC) need to rethink their strategies on how to bid for railway capacity, while the IM faces an even 
greater challenge on how to allocate the limited resource among competing uses“. The simulation game involves the 
following procedure:  
x Firstly, RUs will be asked to analyse the demand, costs, potential profits, crew and rolling stock availability etc. 
and submit train path requests to the IM aiming to maximise their individual profits. To mimic the practice in real 
life, the RUs will be given a reference timetable to work on. When submitting the bids, the RUs will need to 
carefully consider the risk of being rejected if their VOA offered turn out to be too low compared with other 
operators. Each path request contains: the train headcode, its origin-destination, claimed VOA and time window, 
in which the RUs agree to run the service.  
x The train path requests submitted by the RUs above are usually incompatible. The IM can attempt to resolve the 
conflicts by adjusting (e.g. either shifting earlier or later, or making the running time longer by introducing longer 
stop times) the timetable of the train services.  In the worst case, if it is infeasible to accommodate the requested 
path, the IM will need to reject it.  
x After Steps 1 and 2, the RUs will (re-)calculate their profits (i.e. difference between revenue and VOA paid) 
based upon their allocated service, while the IM will calculate the total collected access charge (VOA). 
Depending on the scenario, the process may either terminate or go through further negotiation rounds between 
the RUs and the IM.  
Based on the findings from other research papers and the current capacity allocation policy in the UK, we have 
developed four different regulations sets to be tested: 
x One-shot auction, no changes to initial allocation, no renegotiation; 
x Iterative, renegotiation possible, side payments allowed; 
x One-shot auction, positive discrimination of FOC (subsidy), no changes to initial allocation, no renegotiation; 
x Interactive, positive discrimination of FOC, side payments allowed. 
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Figure 2 (below) presents the flowchart of the simulation game. After each scenario, all participants are asked about 
their strategy and the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed policy.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Railway Capacity Allocation Simulation Game – session structure. 
Once the simulation session with four Imperial College/UCL Transport students was conducted, the bids submitted 
by the RUs with all the timetable information and train graphs were sent to two rail operations experts, who have 
significant experience in train scheduling and routing. The information from the RUs from the session were used to 
assure comparability of the solutions the different IMs arrived at. This assured better representativeness of results and 
enabled comparisons. Moreover, the industrial collaborators filled in the same set of questionnaires as the IM in the 
simulation session. 
6. Results 
This section summarises and discusses the results observed from the simulation games. Some limitations, potential 
improvements and policy implications are described.   
6.1. Main findings 
There are three IMs (IM1, IM2, and IM3) in the experiment, where IM1 and IM2 are experienced railway 
professionals and IM3 is a MSc student in transport. The simulation results reveal that IM1 and IM3 would try to 
accommodate all train path requests by the RUs, while IM2 would reject the most disrupting freight service. During 
the experiment, it is found that inserting a slow freight train would introduce many conflicts with other trains and most 
difficulties in scheduling. It can be clearly seen that acceptance of slower freight trains leads to disrupting the regularity 
of passenger trains. The expected waiting time is greater and this causes more inconvenience for passengers, 
potentially decreasing the attractiveness of the mode. This echoes the findings in Klabes (2010). Strategy of rejecting 
the freight service request seems to bring best results to the system in terms of social welfare and capacity utilisation 
but not fairness among different kinds of RUs.  
The quality of the proposed solutions seems to depend on the level of expertise and experience in solving train 
scheduling problems. Ratio analysis provided evidence on that (available on request from the author). In general, it is 
found that the effect of allowing renegotiation in Scenarios 2 and 4 indeed is insignificant and the timetable structure 
mostly has been fixed after the first round. The preferential treatment for freight trains in Scenarios 3 and 4 does not 
bring any major changes to timetabling outcome, with the exception that it was more costly to shift and reject freight 
trains. Therefore, train graphs of IM’s 1 and 3 show more packets of parallel passenger services among the more 
dispersed freight trains.  
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Counter-intuitively, passenger operators are currently preferentially treated in the UK because their constraints on 
cyclicality and train path families need to be analysed jointly. Moreover, in reality TOCs are subsidised by the 
government while FOCs run on a purely commercial basis. Freight trains are also slower, which results in a natural 
tendency to a priori assign higher priority to passenger services. Many operators competing for the same demand might 
cause excessive frequency of passenger services (thus making it more difficult for the freight trains to be licensed a 
slot; it is in line with Tirole (1992)) but higher quality of service might induce demand growth for the future. Ticketing 
data (and not only franchising obligations) should be used to regularly review the required level of service and 
introduce corrections (this is analysed only from the perspective of capacity allocation not from the perspective of 
inconvenience for passenger, disinformation etc.). Difficulties in extracting the true information about the ideal 
schedules and excessive frequency problems might give arguments for the proponents of the centralised railway 
system, which might work better in certain aspects and enhance the social welfare. Currently assigned priorities 
(indirect/direct) have an impact on the bargaining position of the RUs and hence the market structure, which might 
give incentives for coalition formation, predation and collusion. Use of previous years’ timetables introduces 
anchoring, which affects not only the IM but also the RUs since they submit bids basing on the former schedule and 
hence it is difficult to produce a radically different schedule structure (vicious circle). See Nilsson (2002). 
Renegotiation talks are associated with high transaction costs, and are prone to collusion. Usually the swaps are 
one-to-one because it is challenging to convince a group of operators to behave in a certain way and analyse the global 
impact of the change in advance. Moreover, it is difficult to arrive at radically different solutions from the ones initially 
proposed by the IM. On the other hand, it is possible to find win-win situations and the procedure helps RUs realise 
the complexity of the problem. There is no unique global solution to the RCAP – area/route specific strategies should 
apply. None of the frameworks works perfectly; there will be always a worse-off entity if conflicts occur. This closely 
corresponds to a hypothesis by Cai, Goh & Mees (1998). Learning process, being the consequence of the game 
repetitiveness, results in more ‘clever’ strategies of the RUs (experience). The more decentralised the market structure 
is, the more difficult the renegotiation talks are. 
All the schemes provide guidance for investment decisions: introducing an overtaking possibility south of Keymer 
Junction would enable to let a packet of faster passenger trains pass while a freight train would be taken to the side 
track. This would also increase the flexibility of scheduling, however, the impact on costs (especially energy) should 
be investigated (cost functions of different operators should be specified). Timetable provides important information 
that could potentially guide further investments. Framework that could automatically detect such decisions should be 
developed. 
Traffic heterogeneity (and their way of scheduling) has a negative impact on efficiency as differences in speeds and 
no overtaking/rerouting possibilities results in capacity losses. There is a trade-off between efficiency and fairness: the 
results showed that if all trains were accepted, the infrastructure was less efficiently utilised; if the most disrupting 
service was rejected, the solution was less fair as there were huge differences in to which extent each operator and 
hence the corresponding customer suffers. Using a proxy for fairness that ‘everyone suffers to the same extent’ seems 
to be reasonable but might be difficult to introduce in practice because of imperfect information. Moreover, differences 
in travel times, ideal schedule structure etc. make it even more complicated to assure this condition is met. 
Controversies around calculation of the impact on social welfare and inconclusiveness of results make it difficult to 
assess the hypothetical effect of the preferential treatment of FOC’s. 
However, positive discrimination of FOC (in the form of access charge subsidy) has little impact on the schedule 
structure (with the exception that it would be more difficult to shift or reject a freight train) since technical aspects 
(such as travel times) are more important in case of most disrupting services if they are allocated a slot or not. The 
access charge only determines the priority in relation to other conflicting requests or, in other words, determines how 
far the train is shifted away from its ideal schedule when needs are in conflict. Preferential treatment of FOC’s seems 
to give rise to free-riding incentives (positively discriminated TOCs lower the claimed VOA as their bid would be 
subsided anyway). 
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Fig. 3 An example of train graphs produced by different IMs for scenario 1  
(other train graphs and outputs available on request from the author). 
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If there is some ‘obvious’ positive discrimination introduced to the system, there are incentives for other RUs to 
collaborate. TOCs tried to defend their position (risk for collusion and predatory behaviour – typical case in 
oligopolies) by agreeing on strategy of bidding to crowd out the positively discriminated competitor. Interestingly, 
TOCs did not perceive the status quo of the system as unfair a framework and this is in spite of the fact that they were 
preferentially treated as a result of train path families and cyclical services constraints. Moreover, FOC also did not 
mention the problem but seemed to accept the current policy. Introduction of preferential treatment of freight trains 
might be difficult in practice because of the possible objection from the passengers and TOCs. 
6.2. Limitations 
Valuable models always use simplifications and also this work was based on a set of assumptions, which enabled 
to capture the essence of the RCAP. For instance it would be possible to introduce different objective functions, vary 
the headway or use other cost/revenue formulations, however, inability to obtain reliable information and unaddressed 
research gaps would add further uncertainty and unnecessarily complicate the problem even further. Mathematical 
representation was also fairly simple to exclude purely numerical challenges and focus on rail operations only. 
One significant difficulty was the analysis of impacts on the social welfare – the proxy used for that might not be 
ideal and suffers from no environmental and distributional aspects covered by the indicator. Nevertheless, it was the 
best approximation that could have been used under this framework. The amount of information the participants had 
to cope with was already very large in the current form of the study. Additional aspects would unnecessarily complicate 
the scenarios even further and thus might overshadow the core of the problem, which was the strategic allocation of 
railway capacity. A major weakness is that regulations sets were tested on only one railway line and more case studies 
should have been developed to test the validity of the proposed changes on the broader scale. Due to time constraints 
the heavily congested line with mixed traffic was chosen, it was a recommended one by RSSB and should be used 
rather as a starting point for further research. Representativeness of results might be questioned because of the small 
number of experimental scenarios conducted, however, the reasoning behind introducing experiments was to simulate 
the auctioning process that closely corresponds to the one implemented in reality. The participants had transport 
background and their understanding of the RCAP was tested prior to the session. Nevertheless, the results should be 
treated more as a kind of focus group insights to guide further research. Introduction of experienced railway 
professionals was to improve representativeness and enable comparisons. Table 1 shows examples of identified 
limitations and proposed improvements. 
Table 1. Limitations and potential improvements to this research. 
Limitation Potential improvement 
Cost functions  
Introduce more realistic cost functions covering energy, rolling stock, crew costs, opportunity costs etc.; 
introduce IM cost function too. 
Deterministic framework 
Add probabilistic elements e.g. revenue from passenger services, delays, equipment failures and incidents, 
etc. (derived from real data) 
Environmental, social, 
distributional aspects excluded 
Introduce these aspects into the framework and analyse what impact the additional freight trains might 
have on e.g. the environment; possibly specify social function for railway operations and expand on the 
social value of track access 
Ideal schedule  
pre-determined 
Test the framework under different sets of ideal schedules; allow for mistakes in specifications by the 
RUs and IM’s 
Just four regulations  
sets tested 
Specify other sets of regulations and test them experimentally (e.g. add other aspects than pairs such as: 
one-shot/iterative, current/preferential treatment of FOC etc.) 
No delays 
Add probabilistic elements reflecting delays for services and investigate their impacts on network 
resilience under different regulatory frameworks 
No optimisation tools used 
Use optimisation and simulation software to test the proposed sets of regulations; use real train path 
requests for the next year schedule to simulate capacity allocation 
One railway line only Use other heavily congested, mixed traffic lines to test frameworks to assure better representativeness  
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Limitation Potential improvement 
Operational simplifications 
Add shadow paths for ad hoc trains (% of capacity left for very short notice trains), add constraints on 
back loads, interchange windows etc. 
Preferential treatment of FOC – 
subsidy only 
Check what the implications for efficiency, fairness and social welfare would be if FOC was positively 
discriminated not in the form of subsidies to track access but e.g. available passenger-freight train mix 
ratios that should be kept for each line 
Revenue functions  Introduce more complex revenue function; add probabilistic elements etc. 
Simple mathematical framework 
Introduce other necessary mathematical formulations, relax the assumptions, add further constraints and 
aspects that should be specified mathematically, other 
Train graph construction 
Add intermediary stops, allow different running times of trains, incorporate time for train division, use 
both south- & northbound traffic and add constraints related to that (such as rolling stock, back loads 
problems etc.); analyse the impact on other lines 
Others ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6.3. Policy implications 
The current UK framework favours passenger trains, however, subsiding access charges of FOCs would decrease 
efficiency and improve only fairness of capacity allocation. Results on social welfare are inconclusive. The major 
policy focus should be on continuous assessment of the needed frequency of passenger trains to avoid unnecessary 
capacity consumption, and prioritising investments that would increase flexibility of rail by enabling more efficient 
train scheduling, especially in heavily congested mixed-traffic environments like BML. Regulations should be tailored 
at specific parts of the network and differentiation of objectives and priorities should generate better aggregate results. 
Moreover, the government should encourage research on RUs cost and revenue functions, and mechanisms that would 
extract true information about VOA. Finally, in the aspects of capacity allocation, centralised systems with just one 
rail service provider could potentially work better but trade-offs with the benefits of open access and competition 
should be reviewed. 
7. Conclusions 
This study investigates the railway timetabling process in a privatised market through simulation games. In 
particular, we explore the possibility of enhancing the competitiveness of freight train operations through 
implementation of proper regulations. It is found that introduction of preferential treatment of FOC in the form of 
subsiding track access may not bring desired outcomes in terms of efficiency but could potentially improve fairness 
of capacity allocation. The impact on social welfare is inconclusive, but the value of freight seems to be 
underestimated. This study reveals the difficulty of determining a unique and global policy on capacity allocation and 
different objectives and rules of allocation should apply to different parts of the UK network. Furthermore, the project 
showed the link to investment decisions that from the perspective of infrastructure utilisation should prioritise 
investments for slower freight trains, especially on heavily congested lines, by providing e.g. overtaking possibilities, 
to increase flexibility of scheduling and reduce amount of lost capacity, being a result of the traffic heterogeneity. 
The simulation experiments conducted in this study show that the level of IM’s expertise and experience will have 
an important impact on the outcome of the initially proposed schedule. Renegotiation may help achieving better results 
but it is difficult to radically improve the initial timetable.  One-shot auctions are less prone to collusion; negotiation 
provides scope for predatory behaviour, free-riding incentives and is associated with higher transaction cost. Extracting 
true VOA is crucial to obtain better solutions but: there are no mechanisms to extract true information from the Railway 
Operators and in reality it is difficult even for themselves to determine revenues and costs from individual services, 
which indicates further research opportunities. 
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